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Filling the Gaps: Hurne and 
Connectionism on the Continued 
Existence of Unperceived Objects 
MARK COLLIER 
In Book I, part iv, section 2 of the Treatise, “Of scepticism with regard to the 
senses,” Hume presents two different answers to the question of how we come 
to believe in the continued existence of unperceived objects.’ He rejects his 
first answer shortly after its formulation, and the remainder of the section 
articulates an alternative account of the development of the belief. The 
account that Hume adopts, however, is susceptible to a number of insur- 
mountable objections, which motivates a reassessment of his original propos- 
al. This paper defends a version of Hume’s initial explanation of the belief in 
continued existence and examines some of its philosophical implications. 
The question of how we acquire the belief in continued existence poses a 
hard problem for Hume, since he is committed to two theses which severely 
constrain the answers he can give. The first thesis, indeed the first principle of 
Hume’s science of human nature, is that all of our ideas are derived from 
impressions (T 7).2 The second is that the sequences of impressions that con- 
stitute our acquaintance with objects are “gappy”; one need only turn one’s 
gaze away from an object, or simply blink, to cause the train of perceptions to 
become fragmentary and interrupted? The conjunction of these two theses 
threatens to render an empiricist explanation of continued existence 
intractable. On the one hand, the idea of continued existence must arise from 
the senses, yet on the other, the senses do not directly deliver this information. 
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Because the senses can play no more than a partial explanatory role, Hume 
must recruit the help of an additional faculty to supplement the information 
they deliver. The faculty to which he turns, as he does so often in the Treatise, 
is the faculty of the imagination. Hume’s “hypothesis” is that the belief in con- 
tinued existence emerges from the interaction of the senses and the imagina- 
tion, or in his own words, the “concurrence of some [sensory] qualities with 
the qualities of the imagination” (T 194). Hume’s general explanatory strategy 
in Treatise’I iv 2, then, is threefold. First, he will isolate the sensory qualities 
that are involved in attributions of continued existence. Second, he will pro- 
vide an account of the principles of the imagination that accompany instances 
of the belief. Finally, he will explain how the principles of the imagination 
interact with the sensory qualities to produce the belief in continued exis- 
tence. 
In fact, Hume presents two formulations of this hypothesis. Let us reverse 
the order of Hume’s exposition and begin with the second formulation. As dic- 
tated by his explanatory strategy, Hume must first choose the sensory qualities 
to play the partial explanatory role. Amid the changing contents of con- 
sciousness, he tells us, certain series of impressions exhibit the property of 
“constancy.” A series of impressions is constant if it is interrupted, yet recom- 
mences without any qualitative alteration. Adopting Barry Stroud’s formalism, 
we may express a paradigmatic constant series the following way, with letters 
representing impressions, and squares representing observational gaps:’ 
A A A A A A n  n n AAAAAA 
The resemblance of the impressions on each side of the gap is an important 
feature of constant series, since the resulting association leads the imagination 
to pass over the interruption in the sequence and conflate the broken series 
with one that is c ~ m p l e t e . ~  Subsequent reflection upon the appearance of such 
series, however, reveals their undeniable diversity. The result is a conflict of 
principles, which the imagination can only resolve through the supposition 
that the object continued to exist, although unperceived (T 199). 
Unfortunately, there are a number of reasons why this explanation, which 
we might call the “con flation” account, has neither the virtues of plausibility 
nor consistency. First, the exclusive appeal to constancy represents a signifi- 
cant confusion on Hume’s part. Constancy cannot be the sole sensory quality 
accompanying all of our ascriptions of continued existence, because we 
attribute continuity to both changing and unchanging series. Second, the 
appeal to a propensity of the imagination to disregard gaps between similar 
impressions appears intolerably ad hot.' Finally, this formulation’s employ- 
ment of the imagination is in tension with Hume’s portrayal of the automatic 
and implicit character of the imagination elsewhere in the Treatise (T 104). The 
conflation account requires the imagination to perform a metajudgment-the 
H U M E  STUDIES 
Filling the Gaps 157 
c- 
resolution of conflict between judgments of unity and diversity-that should 
belong to the reflective faculty of the understanding.” 
The deficiencies of the conflation account force us to reconsider Hume’s 
original proposal, in the hope that it avoids these shortcomings. The first com- 
ponent of Hume’s initial formulation is a sensory quality which he entitles t h e  
“coherence,” or elsewhere simply the “regularity,” of the changing contents of 
consciousness (T 195). Two sequences cohere when they conform to similar 
patterns of change. Unlike constancy, which is a characteristic of static objects 
like houses and chairs, coherence is a property of processes that fluctuate over 
time. Hume helps to clarify the meaning of the term coherence through his 
example of a gap in his observation of a fire. He remarks: 
When I return to my chamber after an hour’s absence, I find not my 
fire in the same situation, in which I left it. (T 195) 
Using the above formalism, we can describe Hume’s impressions over this 
duration as: 
A A A B B B 1n r l  D D D E E E 
Hume notices that the qualities of the fire have changed from “B” to “D”; nev- 
ertheless, he continues: 
But then 1 am accustom’d in other instances to see a like alteration 
produc’d in a like time, whether I am present or absent, near or 
remote (T 195). 
In other words, although the series is discontinuous, its pattern of change 
through time resembles a continuous series that has been previously observed: 
AAAB B B CCC D D D E EE 
Hume’s example is intended to bring out the fact that there are recurrent 
dependencies among the items of coherent series; for example, fires change 
from orange to gray, and not vice versa. 
The important differences between Hume’s two accounts, however, do not 
concern their choice of either constancy or coherence; once again, a compre- 
hensive explanation of the belief in continued existence must cover both vari- 
able and invariable series. What really distinguishes the two formulations is 
their competing account of the role of the imagination in the development of 
the belief, and their rival proposals for the properties of the imagination that 
allow it to perform this function. Whereas the imagination resolves a contra- 
diction between identity and diversity in the conflation account, in Hume’s 
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original formulation it resolves conflicts between the present and the past (T 
197). Once again, a look at one of Hume’s examples will help clarify his rea- 
soning. We are asked to imagine Hume still gazing at his fireplace, when sud- 
denly he hears the sound “as of“ a door turning upon its hinges. In the past, 
the sound of creaking door hinges had been accompanied by the sight of an 
opening door, but in the present instance the door is heard but not seen. 
Hume claims that this observation conflicts with the previous connection of 
the events,,and in order to remove this disparity, the imagination fills in the 
gap by “supposing” that the door continues to exist unperceived (T 197). 
Hume maintains that this operation is completely commonplace: 
There is scarce a moment of my life, wherein there is not a similar 
instance presented to me, and I have not occasion to suppose the con- 
tinu’d existence of objects, in order to connect their past and present 
appearances, and give them such an union with each other, as I have 
found by experience to be suitable to their particular natures and cir- 
cumstances. Here then I am naturally led to regard the world as some- 
thing real and durable, and as preserving its existence, even when it is 
no longer present to my perception. (T 197) 
In order to complete this explanation, which we might call, with H. H. 
Price, the “assimilation” account, Hume needs only to articulate the principles 
of the imagination that underlie its capacity to fill in gaps.8 Hume turns, then, 
to examine whether any of the resources of his science of human nature fit the 
bill. He begins with the habits of custom, but soon discovers that custom can- 
not play the required role, since custom cannot impose a greater regularity 
than is observed. 
’[TJis not only impossible, that any habit shou’d ever be acquir’d oth- 
erwise than by the regular succession of these perceptions, but also 
that any habit shou’d ever exceed that degree of regularity. Any 
degree, therefore, of regularity in our perceptions, can never be the 
foundation for us to infer a greater degree of regularity in some 
objects, which are not perceiv’d; since this supposes a contradiction, 
viz. a habit acquir’d by what was never present to the mind. (T 197) 
Jonathan Bennett finds this dismissal puzzling, and suggests that Hume fails 
to provide adequate support for his claim that custom is in~ufficient.~ Bennett, 
however, overlooks an important insight of Hume’s regarding the limits of cus- 
tom-based explanations of our belief in continued existence. Custom can 
explain why we anticipate seeing the door when we hear creaking hinges, 
since the two types of events have been constantly conjoined in the past, and 
we naturally infer from similar effects to similar causes (T 87). Nevertheless, 
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custom cannot explain why we believe the door continues to exist when this 
expectation is disappointed. As Hume makes clear in his analysis of probabili- 
ty, “contrary experiments” can weaken habits of custom, but habits of custom 
cannot strengthen contrary experiments (T 135). He concludes that the 
propensity to infer a greater regularity than is observed must be due to the 
influence of some other principles of the imagination (T 198). 
With custom, the most likely candidate to serve as the desired principle of 
the imagination, deemed inadequate to perform the supplementative func- 
tion, Hume turns to a principle of the imagination that he introduced in his 
discussion of the foundations of mathematics in Treatise I ii 4. In order to 
explain how mathematicians arrive at exact standards in geometry, Hume 
relied on the notion that the mind sometimes outruns the data of the senses 
and constructs imaginary standards, such as the standard of perfect quality (T 
48). Hume now refers to this tendency of the imagination as a type of cognitive 
momentum. 
m h e  imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to con- 
tinue, even when its object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by 
the oars, carries on its course without any new impulse. (T 198) 
Hume’s galley metaphor, however, falls short of a principled account of the 
capacity of the imagination. His figurative language is more of an allusion to 
an explanation than an articulation of the precise qualities of the imagination 
that allow it to perform this role; worse, the appeal to a tendency to glide over 
interruptions appears at least as ad hoc as the principle invoked by the confla- 
tion account. 
In any case, Hume is dissatisfied with his appeal to a bias of the mind 
toward the discovery of greater uniformity, and declares the principle “too 
weak to support so vast an edifice, as is that of the continued existence of all 
external bodies” (T 198-199). Hume also expresses dissatisfaction with his 
exclusive use of coherence, and claims that constancy must be added to the 
account.’O So, without any further explanation, Hume drops his proposed solu- 
tion, goes back to drawing board, and formulates his conflation account of the 
origins of the belief. Perhaps we ought not let Hume abandon his original pro- 
posal so easily, however. Bennett, for example, laments Hume’s “abrupt” and 
“dogmatic” remarks about the weakness of the imagination, and maintains 
that Hume “turns his back on the success” of his initial explanation and “mis- 
represents it as a failure.”11 The interpretative question that ought to be 
pressed, then, is whether a Humean can rescue the assimilation account by 
demystifying the imagination’s supplementative role in experience. 
One proponent of an affirmative response is Price, who claims that Hume 
was on to something “real and important.”’* Although Price defends a version 
of Hume’s account, he does so only after distinguishing between two ways in 
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which the imagination assimilates fragmentary observations. Price’s first type 
of assimilation, “assimilation by convergence,” captures the supplementary 
activity of the imagination in cases such as Hume’s door example. In that 
example, a complete standard had been given to the senses in past experience. 
Price credits Hume with the insight that we do not jettison this standard, even 
in the face of recalcitrant experience; on the contrary, these observations are 
assimilated to our previous standards, and the order and structure of the past 
regularities are used to fill in their gaps.13 Price refers to the capacity to impose 
past standards onto the present as the “inertia pr in~iple .”’~ Unfortunately, 
Price does not attempt to identify the qualities of the imagination that account 
for this propensity, since he considers the inertia of the imagination to be an 
“ultimate and not further explicable tendency.”I5 
Nevertheless, recent developments in cognitive science allow us to speci- 
fy an associative mechanism that grounds the disposition to supplement 
incomplete perceptions. According to connectionist models of cognition, 
assimilation by convergence simply falls out of the way in which the mind 
processes information. Connectionist networks recognize objects by assimilat- 
ing them to the prototype with which they share the most features.I6 Even 
when objects are partial or degraded, the network can still recognize them by 
a process known as “vector-completion,” or what Paul Churchland calls “fill- 
ing in the gaps.”16 Churchland provides an illustrative example of vector-com- 
pletion by asking us to imagine a coyote who spots what appears to be a tail 
protruding from a dense patch of grass. Even though the rest of the animal is 
occluded, the coyote can complete the perceptual pattern after matching the 
tail to the prototype that it best fits.I8 Interestingly, Price uses a strikingly sim- 
ilar example in his account of the process of assimilation by convergence, 
when he asks us to imagine that we see a furry tail sticking out from behind a 
sofa.l9 We do not assume, he says, that the tail exists independently, but rather 
we fill in the perceptual gap by supposing that the tail is attached to an unob- 
served cat. In both vector-completion and assimilation by convergence, then, 
a complete standard is used to subsume partial sensory input, and this allows 
observational gaps to be filled in. 
The hypothesis cannot rest on assimilation by convergence alone, howev- 
er, since there may be cases where the past regularities used to assimilate bro- 
ken series are themselves fragmentary. Although Hume himself does not 
consider this possibility, Price distinguishes a second type of assimilation 
appropriate for such cases, which he calls, following C. D. Broad, “assimilation 
by superposition.” Assimilation by superposition involves the following pro- 
cedure, which is general in the sense that it is indifferent to whether the series 
exhibits constancy (as in column 1) or coherence (as in column 2). First, one 
must observe a number of partial series, such as: 
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U A A A A  O B C D E  
A O A A A  A O C D E  
A A O A A  A B U D E  
A A A O A  A B C U E  
A A A A O  A B C D O  
Although no continuous standards are observed, the imagination can produce 
a new, complete standard by superposing them one upon another: 
A A A A A  A B C D E  
Unlike assimilation by convergence, in which partial series are assimilated to 
past continuous series, in this type of case the past series are first assimilated 
to each other.2o We may call the standards produced in this way “virtual stan- 
dards.’’ Since the virtual standards are complete, they can be used to f i l l  in new 
instances of the partial sequences. 
As was the case with assimilation by convergence, however, assimilation 
by superposition stands in need of defense. Which qualities of the imagination 
support the mutual assimilation of the past series? Without an account of the 
specific principles of the imagination that underwrite the alleged propensity, 
Price can be accused of unwarranted speculation. Once again, however, con- 
nectionist networks vindicate the assimilation account by grounding the dis- 
position to superpose past standards in the intrinsic properties of an 
associative mechanism. In fact, connectionists themselves employ the term 
“superposition” to describe the way in which patterns of information are 
stored in networks.21 Information storage is superpositional i f  the same 
resources (in this case, the configuration of weights across the units of the net- 
work) are used to represent all the patterns that are learned. Since multiple pat- 
terns are learned on the same set of weights, the network will develop a 
prototypical representation of their commonalities.22 What this means, for our 
purposes, is that the network will automatically search for uniformity among 
the partial series that are observed and create virtual standards. Price’s assimi- 
lation by superposition, according to connectionism, falls out of the way the 
mind stores information. 
Once the assimilation account is extended along these lines, there remains 
nothing mysterious about the process whereby the imagination imposes a 
greater degree of regularity than is actually observed. Not only can the imagi- 
nation fill in gaps in present sequences by assimilating them to past standards, 
but it can fill in gaps in the past standards themselves through the process of 
superposition. Moreover, this formulation of the hypothesis circumvents all 
three of the objections that were posed to the conflation account. First, both 
types of assimilation operate on either constancy or coherence; constant series 
are treated as a special case of coherent series in which all the items are mutu- 
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ally re~embl ing .~~ Second, whereas the supplementative activity of the imagi- 
nation appears ad hoc in the conflation explanation, in the assimilation 
account it is grounded in the fundamental properties of information-process- 
ing systems. Finally, unlike the conflation account’s reliance on the imagina- 
tion’s ability to resolve contradictions, the process whereby the imagination 
fills in gaps in the assimilation account is nonreflective; all that is involved is 
the processing and storage of information in an associative mechanism. 
Of cburse, it is one thing for a hypothesis to be consistently formulated, 
and another for it to be empirically adequate. Nonetheless, not only does con- 
nectionist theory allow us to complete the assimilation hypothesis by supply- 
ing the missing principles of the imagination, but connectionist methodology 
provides the experimental conditions under which the hypothesis can be 
implemented and tested. Connectionist researchers in the field of cognitive 
development have recently devised computer models that simulate the acqui- 
sition of a child’s concept of object p e r m a n e n ~ e . ~ ~  The researchers use a Simple 
Recurrent Network (SRN) for their experiments (see Figure l).25 






Figure 1: Simple recurrent network architecture 
SRNs are essentially inductive mechanisms; they learn to make predictions 
about what will happen in the future on the basis of what has happened in the 
past. SRNs also perform vector-completion and superposition. These networks 
thus serve nicely as models of the mental machinery posited by the assimila- 
tion hypothesis. 
In the connectionist simulations, the researchers present the SRN with a 
stream of images projected onto an artificial retina. These sequences represent 
what developmental psychologists refer to as an “occlusion event”, in which 
an object disappears and reappears from behind an occ1uder.26 An illustration 
of the type of sequences used in these experiments is provided in Figure Z2’ 
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Figure 2: Simulation training data 
We can interpret the event sequence in Figure 2 in terms of our formalism by 
letting “A” stand for a time step where the object is visible, and letting a gap 
correspond to a time step during which the object is occluded: 
A A A A O O O A  
Notice that this a constant series, since the object does not change after the 
occlusion. When the network is presented with such sequences, the problem 
it confronts is a formal analogue of the one that Hume faces when he “shuts 
his eye” or “turns his head“ and loses sight of the invariable “mountains, and 
houses, and trees, which lie at present under my eye” (T 194). According to the 
assimilation account, though, what does the explanatory work is not the 
mutual resemblance of the items in the sequence, but the resemblance 
between the sequence and complete standards observed in the past. 
The assimilation hypothesis predicts that the interaction of the sensory 
data with the principles of assimilation will be sufficient to infer continued 
existence. Let us now turn to the simulation results and see whether they sub- 
stantiate this prediction. How well do these networks learn the task? During 
the early stages of training, the network shows little success. The reason is that 
the network bases its inferences on the past behavior of the object, and at this 
point in development it has had very little experience. In other words, the net- 
work has no a priori understanding of the characteristics of objects, and with- 
out having sampled a large enough portion of the data set, the network would 
have no way to anticipate that a particular train of events will occur. It is only 
by observing the contingencies of the data that the network can learn to make 
successful predictions. 
Once the network has had sufficient exposure to the regularities in the 
data set, it does learn to anticipate that the object will be visible when the 
occluder moves away. The learning curve in Figure 3 demonstrates that the 
accuracy of the network’s inferences about the continued existence of objects 
develops gradually as a function of its increasing experience.2R When the train- 
ing period is complete, the network predicts the object will be visible when the 
barrier moves away with a small degree of error. According to the connection- 
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Figure 3: Simulation learning curve 
ist researchers, the trained network has developed a “sensitivity” to the con- 
tinued existence of the 
Of course, one might argue that sensitivity to the reappearance of the 
object is not itself a guarantee that the network represents the object as con- 
tinuing to exist while unperceived, since the network might solve the predic- 
tion task by inferring that the object pops in and out of existence during the 
occlusion event. How can we be sure the network has in fact learned to repre- 
sent the continued existence of the unperceived object in order to solve the 
task? One of the relative benefits of computer simulation over human experi- 
mentation is that modeling offers researchers a chance to peek into the head, 
as it were, of the network in order to examine the representations that are 
formed during learning.30 In their simulation, the researchers recorded the pat- 
terns of activity across the network’s hidden unit representations of the object 
as it learned to predict its re-emergence from behind the ~ccluder.~’ Here are 
the Hinton diagrams of these units (1, 8, 10, 11, and 15) after 100, 200,’and 
1,000 epochs of training. The units that code for the object are shown as shad- 
ed squares, and the darkness and size of the square correspond to the magni- 
tude and sign of the c o n n e c t i ~ n . ~ ~  Notice the gradual increase of the strength 
of the internal representation of the object during those time steps when it is 
As the assimilation hypothesis predicts, the network can extract continu- 
ity from a discontinuous data set, and it can do so without relying on any 
innate representations. The experimental results demonstrate that the belief in 
continued existence can arise solely from the interaction of sensory informa- 
tion with the principles of an information-processing mechanism. The simu- 
lations are therefore “existence proofs” of the possibility of an empiricist 
solution to the problem with which we began. 
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The idea that connectionism vindicates Hume might appear puzzling at 
first. How, after more than 250 years, could a research program in cognitive sci- 
ence converge on a similar answer as Hume? The surprise dissipates, however, 
upon recognition that Hume and connectionism confront the same problem 
space-to give a causal explanation of the origins of our belief in continued 
existence-and they impose similar constraints on its solution. First, connec- 
tionists agree with Hume that our acquaintance with objects is often punctu- 
ated by ipterruptions. Second, connectionists hold a version of Hume’s thesis 
that the representation of continued existence must nonetheless be derived 
from the sensory input. While connectionism and nativism are not logically 
incompatible-a connectionist could easily handset the initial weights of the 
network-their account of development is offered as an alternative to the view 
that innate representations are required to guide the acquisition of knowledge 
of continued existence.34 Since they make these two Humean commitments, 
connectionists face the Humean challenge of explaining how continued exis- 
tence can be inferred from discontinuous data, which makes an appeal to prin- 
ciples that allow the network to transcend the data a sensible route. 
Given the recent evidence from cognitive science, we might agree with 
Bennett’s assessment of Hume’s initial explanation: “Schematic as the account 
admittedly is, it seems to be on the right lines.”35 With hindsight, it is unfor- 
tunate that Hume prevented himself from thinking through his original pro- 
posal. Hume abandoned his assimilation hypothesis because he lacked a viable 
principle of the imagination that could account for its capacity to fill in gaps. 
Nonetheless, recent evidence from cognitive science vindicates Hume’s appeal 
to a supplementative propensity of the imagination, and thus provides his 
account of the etiology of the belief in the continued existence of unperceived 
objects with a great deal of plausibility. 
Let us end our examination of the assimilation account by considering 
some of its philosophical implications. Hume’s purpose in presenting his psy- 
chological explanation of continued existence is to account for our ordinary, 
or in Hume’s terms vulgar, beliefs about objects. According to the conflation 
explanation that Hume adopts, it turns out that these beliefs harbor a number 
of confusions. As a result, Hume closes the section “Of scepticism with regard 
to the senses” by drawing a number of “despairing conclusions” about the 
belief in continued existence.36 These conclusions are premised on his confla- 
tion account, however, and the epistemological status of the natural belief in 
continued existence must be revised when we adopt the assimilation explana- 
tion. . 
Hume’s conflation account maintains that the belief in continued exis- 
tence results from a tendency of the imagination to “confound” gappy and 
complete series (T 203). If we adopt the assimilation account, though, the 
imagination is no longer predisposed toward such an error, since the assimila- 
tion of fragmentary sequences to complete past standards is not a case of mis- 
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taken identity, but one of best fit. Moreover, according to the conflation 
account, the imagination resolves the conflict between the judgments of iden- 
tity and diversity by supposing that impressions exist unperceived. On the 
assimilation account, however, the vulgar are involved in no such muddle. 
According to that account, impressions cease to exist the moment we lose con-  
sciousness of them, but traces of these impressions remain in memory and  can 
be used to fill in gappy sequences. 
Another consequence of adopting the assimilation account is t ha t  the 
wind is taken out of the sails of the “philosophical system.”“ The reason is 
that the philosophical system is parasitic on the confusions of vulgar con- 
sciousness; the philosopher goes to great lengths to show that, contra the vul- 
gar, sensory impressions are in fact “interrupted and perishing” (T 210-21 1 ) .  
When we embrace the assimilation account, then, the critique of the philoso- 
pher misses its target. Moreover, when we abandon the conflation account, the 
metaphysics of the philosophical system is no longer motivated. The philo- 
sophical system attempts to reconcile the gappiness thesis and the belief in 
continued existence by inventing the “double existence” of mind-dependent 
perceptions and mind-independent objects, and “ascribing the interrirption to 
perceptions, and the continuance to objects” (T 215). According to the assirni- 
lation hypothesis, however, the vulgar need not venture beyond the “universe 
of the imagination” to form beliefs about the continued existence of objects, 
since gaps in fragmentary series can be filled by items similar in kind to those 
with which we have been acquainted (T 68).3x 
Hume tells us that he began Treatise I iv 2 with trust in his senses, but a s  
a result of “reviewing” his conflation account of the belief in continued exis- 
tence, he is now “of a quite contrary sentiment, and more inclin’d to repose 
no faith at all in my senses, or rather imagination, than to place in it such a n  
implicit confidence” (T 217). This consequent skepticism comes to a culmina- 
tion on the last page of the section, where Hume writes: 
What then can we look for from this confusion of groundless and 
extraordinary opinions but error and falsehood? And how can we jus- 
tify to ourselves any belief we repose in them? (T 218) 
These confusions, however, are artifacts of the conflation explanation, and 
when we view the natural belief in continued existence through the lenses of 
the assimilation account, it no longer results from a propensity towards error, 
and no longer gives rise to any groundless convictions about the existence of 
unperceivable objects. Skepticism with regard to the senses must therefore find 
some other foothold. 
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NOTES 
Figures 1-4 in this article are reproduced from Y. Munakata, J. McLelland, et al., 
“Rethinking Infant Knowledge: Toward an Adaptive Process Account of Successes 
and Failures in Object Permanence Tasks,” Psychological Review104 (1997), 699, 700, 
and 702-3. I am grateful to Yuko Munakata and the editors of Psychological Review 
for permission to reproduce them here. 
1. Of course, Hume is concerned in this chapter with the origins of our belief in 
the continued and distinct existence of bodies, where distinctness is itself a complex 
term referring to the external and independent existence of bodies. We shall limit 
ourselves here to a discussion of continued existence, however, since the question 
of continuation is logically prior to the question of distinctness. Although Hume 
suggests that continuity and distinctness are materially equivalent, a little reflec- 
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